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In recent years China, Brazil, India, and other so-called ‘‘ris-
ing powers” are playing new roles in development cooperation
in Africa. They have challenged the dominant narratives of
mainstream, northern development aid, and economic exper-
tise. They depict the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Commit-
tee (DAC) framework as imposing conditionalities based on
unequal international relations and the legacies of colonialism.
They contrast their approach as South–South Cooperation
(SSC), rooted in third world solidarity, horizontal exchange,
mutual respect, and complementarity (Alden, Morphet, &
Vieira, 2010; Golub, 2013). Detractors characterize SSC as a
new form of imperialism promoting a scramble for resources
on the African continent to meet the needs of the rapidly
expanding industries and consumer markets of rising powers
(see Carmody, 2011 for a comprehensive discussion of debates
around this theme). Others argue that these new forms of
development cooperation undermine governance reforms,
transparency, and sustainable development (see Alden, 2007,
chap. 4). However, there is also a recognition that these new
forms of development cooperation can both facilitate and com-
plement other sources of aid and trilateral initiatives are
becoming common (Abdenur & da Fonseca, 2013). Thus,
development cooperation is becoming increasingly multilateral
and multipolar.
This paper examines the extent to which the concept of SSC
is creating more scope and space for African development
initiatives, and whether it is resulting in new paradigms of
development that favor the poor, or is resulting in a further
deepening of capitalist accumulation and competition on the
African continent.132. FRAMING SSC IN AFRICA
The rapid rise of new southern powers is reﬂected in global
statistics on trade and ﬂows of foreign direct investment. The
share of developing countries’ participation in foreign direct
investment has grown from 6% in 1980 to 31% in 2012. Trade
between developing countries has rapidly expanded from 8%
of global trade in 1980 to 27% in 2010 (Chaturvedi, 2014, p.
54). This has been further compounded by the 2008 world cri-
sis, and the introduction of austerity measures in developed
economies. In 2012 oﬃcial development assistance (ODA)
from OECD-DAC countries fell by 6% (Abdenur & da
Fonseca, 2013; McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012). In contrast,
investments and ﬁnancial ﬂows from rising powers continued
to expand—although the recent deepening of economic reces-
sion has curtailed this. Rising powers are clearly reshaping the
landscape of development cooperation, but the longer-term
outcomes remain uncertain.
SSC needs to be analyzed within a framework of changing
patterns of aid and investment, and changing capitalist rela-
tions. Increasingly, northern development cooperation is dri-
ven by private sector interests and alignments between the
private and public sectors, and policy is inﬂuenced by commit-
ments to capital accumulation and growth, which are
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Mawdsley, 2015). This ﬁnds manifestation in strategies for
agricultural development that promote commercial agricul-
ture, and notions of ‘‘pro-poor markets” that seek to integrate
small farmers into input markets (Mawdsley, 2015).
Other analysts have argued that the rise of SSC is creating
spaces for new critical engagements in which African states
have more choices and ability to inﬂuence development
policies and negotiate more favorable outcomes (Cheru,
Modi, & Naidu, 2014). However, the role of the state in the
framework of SSC is not necessarily greater than in the
Post-Washington Consensus where it features in correcting
market and institutional imperfections (Fine & Van
Waeyenberge, 2013). The framework of SSC is critical of con-
ditionalities, but not of market liberalization. For example, the
New Structural Economics variant of SSC (Lin & Wang,
2015) is based upon concepts of comparative advantage,
export-oriented production, and state promotion of industrial
policies that reﬂect market opportunities. Economic failures in
developing countries are seen as resulting from not recognizing
appropriate comparative advantages in markets (Lin & Wang,
2015).
Several writers have commented on the increasing accom-
modation between the development frameworks of northern
and rising power partners (Abdenur & da Fonseca, 2013;
Fingerman, 2015; Kragelund, 2015; Mawdsley, 2015).
McEwan and Mawdsley (2012) argue that trilateral coopera-
tion results in the replication of older patterns of northern
hegemony, with DAC countries setting the agenda, and rising
powers serving as cheap contractors, while the beneﬁciaries
remain passive. Mawdsley (2015, p. 4) sees increasing align-
ments between ‘‘transnational economic and political elites
of all hues” to drive capital accumulation deeper and more
unevenly, resulting in new alliances between northern and ris-
ing powers, including among transnational companies.
Many small companies from rising powers are also moving
into Africa, including Chinese and Indian ﬁrms. Shen (2013)
argues that as business becomes increasingly competitive in
China many industries are forced either to upgrade or relocate.
Many of these are not registered with Chinese embassies or
Chambers of Commerce and operate outside formal state pol-
icy, and must negotiate business relationships in African coun-
try states (Shen, 2013). However, these states are not uniform,
but have distinct histories, and trajectories of development that
inﬂuence the outcomes (see Scoones et al., 2016).
This paper critically examines the changing framework of
agricultural development within Africa in the context of
SSC, and the extent to which rising powers—Brazil and China
in particular—are contributing to agricultural transformation
and the emergence of agribusiness accumulation within Africa,
taking Ghana and Mozambique as cases. It attempts to ana-
lyze points of convergence and divergence and the political
economy interests that underlie speciﬁc interventions and
shape the articulation of agrarian development policy and
SSC. 1 The paper examines the extent Chinese and Brazilian
policy contexts and histories shape the interventions in Africa,
and how the structural context of agriculture and agricultural
policies in Mozambique and Ghana limit and inﬂuence the
implementation of agricultural development cooperation and
investments. Ghana represents a country with a relatively
developed smallholder sector, with well established (although
not necessarily successful) state policies to support smallhold-
ers and integrate them into agribusiness value chains and input
markets. In contrast, the Mozambique state favors invest-
ments in large-scale agriculture and services for smallholder
farmers remain relatively underdeveloped.The next section provides a brief sketch of the emergence of
SSC and its relative importance as a concept guiding economic
relations between China, Brazil and African countries. This is
followed by an analysis of the development of agribusiness in
China and Brazil and its bearing on the framing of their agri-
cultural cooperation in Africa. The ﬁnal section examines the
agricultural settings, structures, and policies within Ghana and
Mozambique, and the extent to which these shape, facilitate,
and thwart Brazilian and Chinese agricultural interventions.3. SSC IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
SSC was ﬁrst articulated in the UN in the 1970s as a com-
ponent part of the New International Economic Order
(NIEO). In 1974 the General Assembly of the UN endorsed
the establishment of the Special Unit For Technical Corpora-
tion among Developing Countries (TCDC) within the UNDP,
and in 2004 this was renamed the Special Unit for South–
South Cooperation. SSC emerged as a framework for building
technical cooperation among developing countries to facilitate
self-reliant development. SSC was based on notions of increas-
ing regional integration to ameliorate the shocks of the world
crisis of the 1970s, and to counter the increasing dominance of
the economies of developing countries by multinational corpo-
rations. SSC built upon a framework of third world solidarity
that can be traced back to the 1955 Bandung Conference, and
the Non-Aligned Movement, in which the main principles
informing relations between states were based on peaceful
coexistence, non-interference in domestic aﬀairs and mutual
interest. It was also inﬂuenced by Dependency Theory and
the recommendations of the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Latin America (Bello, 2004; Golub, 2013). The
main objectives were to promote economic autonomy; reform
of the international system of trade and aid; international
mechanisms to correct trade imbalances between North and
South; regulation of multinational corporations and the recog-
nition of rights of sovereignty of countries to control national
resources and economic activities; and preferential trade and
technology exchange arrangements to facilitate economic
growth (Golub, 2013). The dialog for a new international
order took place in the context of the dominant social demo-
cratic reforms of the day, which found expression in the search
for a ‘‘third way” embodied in the Brandt Report, North–
South: A programme for survival (Independent Commission
on International Development Issues, 1980). These demands
were articulated in the Buenos Aires Plan of Action in 1978
and in several regional fora, including the 1981 Lagos Plan
of Action of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, 1981).
The rapid rise of neoliberalism from the 1980s resulted in
the contestation of the framework of the NIEO. Those advo-
cating neoliberal solutions argued that the world economic cri-
sis was a product of inappropriate national policies, distortion
of the economy by state interference and involvement in pro-
duction, and poor governance. As more developing countries
sought relief from the IMF, structural reforms were imposed
upon them as conditionalities. These included opening domes-
tic markets to international capital, divesting state economic
enterprises and focusing on export-oriented production of pri-
mary commodities rather than import-substitution. This
resulted in the retreat of North–South dialog and the NIEO
(Arrighi, 2002).
Nevertheless, SSC continued to be articulated by a small
number of newly industrializing countries as a principle for
countering dependence on Washington and takeovers by
northern multinational corporations. During the 1970s and
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Japanese and Western European capital (Vigevani &
Cepaluni, 2007) to limit its dependence on Washington. With
the opening up of China in 1979, FDI from Hong Kong,
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have been highly signiﬁcant
alongside US investments (Chai & Roy, 2006, p. 137). During
the 1980s SSC began to be articulated by both Brazil and
China in their developing economic relations with Africa.
Before this Brazil had pursued an isolationist policy in Africa,
resulting from its close relations with South Africa and its sup-
port for Portuguese colonialism. This changed in the early
1970s as Brazilian import substitution industrialization was
threatened by the world economic and energy crises, and by
pressures from US multinationals to gain control over the
Brazilian economy. With mounting diﬃculty in balancing pay-
ments and escalating oil imports, Brazil sought to gain new
sources of crude oil and markets for its manufactures in Africa
to oﬀset its mounting import bill (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007).
Brazilian exports to Africa rose rapidly from an annual aver-
age of $16 m a year during 1960–65 to $640 m per annum by
the end of the 1970s. Imports consisted overwhelmingly of
crude oil, which accounted for 70% of total imports, largely
from Nigeria and Angola (Forrest, 1982, pp. 81–82). Technol-
ogy transfer also included the transfer of knowledge skills and
contractual services carried out by Brazilian ﬁrms and techni-
cians, and the establishment of joint ventures with African
parastatal organizations, in which Brazil largely provided
technical skills, within manufacturing, agro-processing, civil
engineering and construction, including roads, hydroelectric-
ity, telecommunications, and mining (Hoﬀman, 1982). These
were articulated within a framework of SSC, which stressed
the success of the Brazil in adapting western technology to
tropical conditions and the suitability of its ‘‘tropicalized”
manufactures for African conditions (Hoﬀman, 1982). With
the end of military rule, the Collor and Cardoso regimes pur-
sued a policy of closer alignment with Washington, and less
emphasis on SSC. The Lula da Silva administration revived
SSC and adopted a policy of diversifying economic ties and
rebuilding diplomatic and trade relations with Africa (Cabral
et al., 2016). As the agribusiness sector became dominant in
the Brazilian economy during the 2000s, the Brazilian state
began to articulate a new development role as an agribusiness
power with relevant technology to solve Africa’s agrarian cri-
sis. A central foreign policy objective is to gain access to US
and EU markets, while building multilateral ties and diversi-
ﬁed economic relations to hedge against dependence on the
north (Moreira, 2009).
In contrast, China has a much longer history of economic
and diplomatic relations with African states, originating in
the 1950s from participation at the Bandung Conference and
establishment of diplomatic relations with Egypt
(Neuhauser, 1968). During the early 1960s China established
relations with radical regimes within Africa, and supported
anti-imperialist national liberation movements. It formed an
alliance with the Nkrumah led CPP government in Ghana to
build support for radical national liberation movements
throughout the continent (Chau, 2014; Ogunsanwo, 1974).
As relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated from 1962
onward, China competed with the Soviet Union for inﬂuence
within Africa. China sought to build relations with developing
countries and with Western Europe and Japan to contain the
inﬂuences of the US and Soviet Union (Yee, 1983). China’s
economic assistance to aid in Africa was centered on the
One China policy, which aimed to gain support for China’s
representation in the UN (Ogunsanwo, 1974). This led to riv-
alry between China and Taiwan to build diplomatic relationswith African states, including through economic aid. When
China gained a seat at the UN in 1971, with considerable
backing from African states, it also became heir to the many
rural development projects initiated by Taiwan in African
countries (Tseng, 2008). Although Chinese aid to Africa from
the 1960s to 1980s was modest, it was eﬀective, low cost and
given on favorable terms, gaining China a signiﬁcant presence
in Africa. Chinese economic assistance was based on agricul-
ture, agri-industrial processing, light industries, and building
and construction of irrigation and hydropower facilities, and
civil construction.
Following the demise of the Soviet Union, China’s policies
in Africa have become less determined by geopolitical consid-
erations and more by economic prospects. They take place in
the context of the modernization of the Chinese economy and
its opening up to foreign investment and structural reforms
(Anshan, 2008; Taylor, 1998). The liberalization of African
markets following structural adjustment has created many
opportunities for Chinese companies to win contracts in con-
struction and infrastructure development. The divestment of
African state enterprises also created avenues for Chinese
investment (Anshan, 2008; Brautigam, 2009; Chaponniere,
Gabas, & Qi, 2010; Sun, 2011). These takeovers led to a signif-
icant shift in Chinese development assistance from aid to eco-
nomic investment. Anshan (2008) argues that the 1980s and
1990s mark an important watershed in China’s presence in
Africa, resulting in a shift to more commercial-oriented invest-
ments and an expansion of investment. China has continued to
build economic linkages with African countries, which serve as
sources of raw materials and markets for manufactures, but
also as arenas for technology transfer and diverse investments.
These linkages continue to be articulated through the frame-
work of SSC, which merges contemporary investments with
the historical symbols of third world solidarity (Scoones
et al., 2016).4. CHINESE AND BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURAL
INTERVENTIONS IN AFRICAN AGRICULTURE
Agricultural development forms an important component of
both China’s and Brazil’s relations with African states. Both
countries are among the top ﬁve agricultural producers in
the world, and both have highly developed public research sys-
tems, and private commercial input suppliers, which look to
expand their inﬂuence. Both countries have powerful agribusi-
ness sectors that operate in global markets and engage in
expansion through takeovers and mergers. From the 1980s
onward there has been a rapid transformation of the
agricultural sector in both countries, which inﬂuences their
agricultural development initiatives in Africa.
(a) Chinese agricultural initiatives in Africa
Agricultural development has formed an important part of
Chinese aid since the 1960s. The main types of agricultural
interventions during the 1960s were state farms with agri-
processing capacities such as in sugar and cotton, irrigation
projects specializing in rice and vegetable cultivation, and
demonstration farms showcasing Chinese technologies and
seeds. These agricultural programs drew much admiration
for their ability to transform yields and train African cultiva-
tors in new but low cost techniques (Baker, 1985; Brautigam,
2009). However, they were poorly integrated into national
agricultural services and highly dependent upon supervision
of Chinese technicians and provisions of machinery, inputs
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(Brautigam, 2009).
In 1978 a major reform was introduced in Chinese agricul-
ture, which involved the demise of collective farms and coop-
eratives and their replacement by the household responsibility
system. Subsequent reforms provided for recognition of
intellectual property rights, membership of World Trade
Organization (WTO), and the vertical integration of
agriculture and smallholder production through the rise of
agribusiness and contract farming (Brautigam, 2009; Li, Xin,
& Yuan, 2009; Zhang & Donaldson, 2008). During the mid-
1990s and early 2000s research, production, extension, and
trade were increasingly incorporated into single, often state-
owned businesses rather than performed by government agen-
cies (Li et al., 2009; Gu et al., 2016). This has led to the growth
of China as an agribusiness power with signiﬁcant machinery,
commercial seed and input sectors. Demonstration farms in
Africa and elsewhere have now been given a new lease of life
to showcase new Chinese technologies (Xu et al., 2016), and
training and exchange programs have become important
routes to linking Chinese agribusiness with new markets
(Tugendhat & Alemu, 2016).
China’s support for the FAO program on SSC provides an
important avenue for collaboration in Africa (El-Namaky &
Demont, 2013; Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2009). Chinese
companies have made large inroads in the distribution of
agrochemicals and farm equipment in Africa and have
beneﬁtted from the drive to expand the reach of agro-dealers
within rural areas. Chinese products frequently dominate
the range of agricultural inputs distributed by these agro-
dealers, sometimes owned and run by Chinese migrants, and
there is intense competition between Chinese companies to
provide cheap and aﬀordable inputs for farmers (Cook
et al., 2016).
Chinese investments in agriculture in Africa focus on the
gradual building of commercial agricultural services and
inputs businesses, rather than on large-scale acquisition of
land for food production for Chinese markets, as is often
presented in the media (Brautigam & Zhang, 2013). Chinese
agricultural investments are likely to proceed through a
gradual expansion of agricultural markets in seed, inputs
and services, alongside the development of research centers
adapting Chinese varieties to local conditions, and a gradual
rise of African commercial farms making use of Chinese
agricultural inputs and creating demand for Chinese agricul-
tural products.
(b) Brazilian agricultural initiatives in Africa
In contrast with China, Brazil does not have a long history
of participation in agricultural development initiatives in
Africa. Brazil is a major exporter of a wide array of processed
foods including, soya, grains, meat products, fruit juices,
sugar, and producer of biofuels. It also has strong agricultural
machinery, input, hybrid seeds, and biotechnology sectors.
The agribusiness sector accounts for about 40% of the value
of exports and about 33% of GDP (Lora, 2012). Conse-
quently, agribusiness now exerts a powerful inﬂuence on
Brazilian economic and foreign policy. The Brazilian state
has supported agribusiness by fostering the development of
strong public research in agriculture. It also actively partici-
pates in building regional free trade blocs, such as the South-
ern Common Market (Mercosur), which create markets for
Brazilian agribusiness, and it lobbies internationally for free
markets and more access for Brazilian agricultural produce
to US and EU markets (Lechini, 2005).The expansion of agribusiness in the 1990s was associated
with the success of national agricultural research, resulting
in new methods of soil management and new plant varieties
(Hosono & Hongo, 2012). It was also associated with the
removal of state subsidies in agriculture and the opening up
of agriculture to foreign investment. By 1997 four multina-
tional corporations (Bunge, Dreyfus, ADM and Cargill) con-
trolled 43% of soy crushing capacity and had acquired 12
domestic ﬁrms (Jank, Franco, Leme, Nassar, & Filho, 2001).
During 1994–99 there were 171 mergers and acquisitions in
the Brazilian food and beverage industry. During the 1990s
17 ﬁrms controlled 43% of agribusiness exports (Jank et al.,
2001). This intensiﬁed competition resulted in the opening
up of new frontiers of production in the Cerrado, to which
many Brazilian ﬁrms and large farmers migrated. Although
initially opened up as an area for smallholders to relieve land
pressures and calls for land reform, large farms were able to
take advantage of the cheap land and labor, and the new tech-
nologies created by Brazilian Agricultural Research Coopera-
tion (Embrapa) with support from the Japanese International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) (Hosono & Hongo, 2012). Dur-
ing the 2000s, many large Brazilian ﬁrms streamlined their
core business, and expanded their scale of production through
mergers and acquisitions. Several of these ﬁrms became some
of the largest global agribusiness ﬁrms; today over 20 Brazilian
agribusiness companies now have annual sales above $US
1 billion (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010).
The success of agribusiness has resulted in a highly distorted
agrarian economy in which 70% of national agricultural out-
put originates from the Cerrado and 1% of farmers produce
over 50% of GNP, while three million farmers (66% of the
total farming population) produce only 3.3% of GNP
(Mueller & Mueller, 2014). Smallholders have been recipients
of social protection programs that create markets for Brazilian
agribusiness supplies companies through the More Food Pro-
gramme, while ameliorating rural poverty and unemployment
(Patriota & Pierri, 2014). Government discourse presents an
agrarian policy that promotes both agribusiness and family
farming (Cabral et al., 2016), however funding is overwhelm-
ingly for corporate agriculture. President Dilma announced a
budget of 133 billion reales for the 2013–14 agricultural plan,
of which 115 billion reales were invested in corporate agricul-
ture and 18 billion in family farming. Much of the investment
in family farming also supports the purchase of machinery to
modernize production and acts as a stimulus for agribusiness
(Araujo, 2013).
The domestic characteristics of the agrarian economy in
Brazil inﬂuence agricultural initiatives in Africa, which articu-
late support for both agribusiness and family farming. They
build upon Brazilian social protection policies that have
become widely acclaimed in international development and
link them to the export of Brazilian technology with conces-
sional loans. The More Food Programme has been extended
from the Brazilian countryside to Mozambique, Ghana, Zim-
babwe, and Kenya to promote family farming, and conces-
sional loans given for purchase of tractors and other farm
machinery. The future development of this program is
expected to include Brazilian seeds and other inputs (Cabral
et al., 2016).
A second area of Brazilian cooperation involves building the
capacity of Embrapa to undertake adaptive research in Afri-
can conditions. An Embrapa oﬃce has been created in Accra.
This is strategically situated within the Council for Scientiﬁc
and Industrial Research (CSIR) complex in Accra, sharing a
building with the Alliance for the Green Revolution in Africa
(AGRA) and the International Food Policy Research Institute
SOUTH–SOUTH COOPERATION, AGRIBUSINESS, AND AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 17(IFPRI). Embrapa also collaborates with Forum for Agricul-
tural Research in Africa (FARA) in Accra, which works clo-
sely with AGRA to promote new agribusiness approaches
and market-led input distribution. These linkages give
Embrapa a presence in international development initiatives
that promote agribusiness and farmer uptake of agribusiness
inputs and seeds, and create potential future channels through
which Brazilian agribusiness can gain entry to African
markets.
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant continental initiative of
Embrapa is the African–Brazilian Agricultural Innovation
Marketplace, supported by international donors, and involv-
ing FARA and the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation
on Agriculture (IICA). 2 The objective of the partnership is
to support the strengthening of agricultural technology devel-
opment in Africa through the establishment of research part-
nerships between researchers working in Africa and Brazil in
agricultural development institutions. Research has dealt with
improving rice, cotton, banana and plantain varieties, irriga-
tion, water, cover crops, rangeland rehabilitation and cassava
harvesting tools in several countries. Through partnerships
with Brazilian institutions, the research fosters the use of
Brazilian technology and provides a platform for Brazilian
expertise in Africa.
Embrapa has also been involved in several technology trans-
fer programs, including rice with the Senegalese Rice Institute,
the Cotton-4 program, which involves extending Brazilian
cotton varieties and technologies to Benin, Burkina Faso,
Chad and Mali, and the ProSAVANA program based on
using technologies developed in the Cerrado to open up
Guinea woodland areas in Mozambique to commercial
agriculture (Patriota & Pierri, 2014).
A third area of Brazilian interest has been in promoting
private sector investments in Africa, particularly in biofuels.
While this sector has attracted much attention within the inter-
national media there has been little materialization of these
projects, particularly as a result of the increasing prices for
food crops and falling prices of petroleum on the world mar-
ket. There are actually very few examples of successful large-
scale Brazilian investments within African agriculture, and
the main focus is the promotion of Brazilian technology,
science and expertise, facilitate a commercial demand for these
services.5. AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT IN GHANA AND
MOZAMBIQUE
In the early independence period most African states
attempted to diversify their agricultural base away from staple
export production for European markets, by establishing
large-scale mechanized estates, agri-industrial sectors, and
promoting commercial food production, all supported by gov-
ernment subsidies. The imposition of structural adjustment
policies resulted in the divestment of state agricultural enter-
prises, the opening up of African domestic markets to interna-
tional food imports, the promotion of export-oriented
agriculture and the removal of subsidies. These initiatives
depressed the use of agricultural inputs among food produc-
ers, and resulted in the neglect of investment in national
research and extensions services. By the mid 2000s this lack
of investment resulted in growing concern among donors
about the failings of agricultural policy (World Bank, 2008).
New international initiatives were introduced to kick-start a
new agricultural revolution in Africa, based on promoting
agricultural markets, new investments in agriculture andinfrastructure, and subsidies on agricultural inputs to encour-
age increasing uptake by smallholder farmers. These develop-
ments have been framed as promoting inclusive development
and social protection. However, they also serve to promote
the deeper penetration of agribusiness into African markets.
This penetration of agribusiness takes two forms. The ﬁrst is
based on corporate food governance in which agribusiness and
supermarket chains shape the production strategies of small-
holders through contract farming arrangements and the build-
ing of networks of farmer organizations and agro-dealers. The
second takes the form of investments in large-scale commercial
agriculture (World Bank, 2009). The World Bank argues that,
while smallholder integration into commercial agriculture is
the most eﬃcient relation, large-scale investments are rational
when agricultural infrastructure is poorly developed and the
private sector becomes responsible for creating infrastructure
as part of its commercial operations (World Bank, 2009). This
historical policy context has in turn shaped Chinese and
Brazilian interventions in agricultural development in both
Ghana and Mozambique.
(a) Ghana
Colonial rule created an agricultural economy that was
dominated by cocoa and smallholder production, with a lack
of large-scale mechanized commercial agriculture. In the early
independence period the main concern of agricultural policy in
Ghana was to diversify production away from cocoa and to
create a viable commercial food production and agri-
industrial sector. Under Nkrumah the main emphasis was
on establishing state farms and cooperatives outside of the
main cocoa zone in the high forest which was reserved for
smallholder production (Grischow, 2006; Miracle &
Seidman, 1968). From the late 1960s to the mid 1970s the main
focus was on the promotion of large-scale private sector agri-
culture, particularly in rice production (Konings, 1986). From
the mid 1970s, with the failure of large-scale producers to meet
domestic needs for food production, the government intro-
duced smallholder contract farming with parastatal organiza-
tions controlling allocation of land (in irrigated areas and oil
palm estates), allocation of inputs and extension advice and
marketing of produce (Amanor, 1999; Daddieh, 1994;
Konings, 1986).
With the adoption of structural adjustment the main
emphasis was on promoting export-oriented agriculture. Most
agricultural budgetary resources were allocated to the cocoa
sector, and there was no systematic program for the food sec-
tor until the 1990s, when the Medium Term Agricultural
Development Programme was launched (Hutchful, 2002).
With removal of subsidies in the early 1980s, fertilizer and cer-
tiﬁed seed usage among farmers declined (FAO, 2005). Food
imports have grown and currently about US$ 1 billion is spent
annually on food imports, mainly on rice and meat products
(Nicely & Ashitey, 2012).
Although structural adjustment dismantled parastatal enter-
prises and state control over input distribution, it was partially
resisted by the state, which maintained its role in cocoa mar-
keting and continues to intervene in contract farming, albeit
in partnerships with the private sector, in which the state pro-
vides extension advice and seeds produced by national agricul-
tural research services. In recent years this has expanded into
an approach based on value chains and food governance,
involving partnerships between the state, NGOs and private
sector. The Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) has
also worked with the private sector to facilitate uptake of
new technologies (Amanor, 2010; Ouma, 2015). Since the
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ages between social protection programs and commercial mar-
ket development in inputs, with food processors and input
distributors working with international and local NGOs to
enable farmer organizations, which provide farmers with
loans, technology packages and guaranteed markets. The state
has also introduced programs to facilitate the spread of agri-
cultural mechanization through the creation of privatized
mechanization centers and procurement of subsidized machinery.
It has encouraged uptake of fertilizers through subsidization.
It has engaged in state procurement through a National Food
Buﬀer Stock Company. It has created a block farming
program, which encourages farmers on contiguous lands to
organize together to receive mechanization services, inputs,
certiﬁed seeds, loans in kind and guaranteed markets for
products (Benin et al., 2013). All this has in turn allowed the
major private agribusiness input distributors to gain increas-
ing control over markets, and opened up opportunities for
new entrants.
State support for agribusiness development has also been
facilitated by international actors. For example AGRA (the
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, supported by the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) has supported programs
on commercial seed breeding, the ﬁnancing of private seed
companies, and the development of agro-dealers (Amanor,
2010). There have also been attempts to revive commercial rice
production for the domestic market with foreign investment.
JICA, the government of South Korea, the EU, World Bank
and Chinese interests have been involved in the rehabilitation
of irrigation projects. Currently there is a concerted eﬀort to
promote irrigation on the Accra Plains with World Bank sup-
port. This involves a public–private partnership model in
which commercial companies are responsible for both infras-
tructure development and contract farming arrangements with
smallholders (Amanor, 2015).
Interventions in land administrative reform, supported by
the World Bank, DFID and the German Federal Enterprise
for International Development (GIZ), has also facilitated
investment. Decentralization of land administration to Cus-
tomary Land Secretariats has been manipulated by chiefs
who have used their recognition as custodians of land to
expropriate farms and sell land to property developers in
peri-urban areas (Ubink, 2008) and to commercial farmers
and foreign investors, creating many tensions within commu-
nities (Amanor, 2009). Beyond this there are many disputes
over land, which results in many uncertainties in the acquisi-
tion of large areas of land for commercial agriculture.
(i) Chinese initiatives in the Ghanaian agricultural sector
The main interventions of China in Ghanaian agriculture
have been in the rice sector. During the early 1970s China
developed several programs in irrigated rice and vegetable
production for smallholder farmers, replacing similar Tai-
wanese projects (Amanor, 2015). However, by the mid 1970s
these programs were transferred back to the Ministry of Agri-
culture, and during the 1980s and 1990s irrigated rice projects
were taken over by other donors including JICA and the EU.
Chinese construction companies continued to play an impor-
tant part in rehabilitating and extending irrigation facilities,
most notably on the Aﬁfe/Weta Irrigation Project, while the
Ministry of Agriculture has maintained control over exten-
sion. One of the largest Chinese construction companies work-
ing in Ghana, ChinaGeo is interested in investing in irrigation
and food crop cultivation. It has established a small pilot pro-
ject at Aveyime. However, it has also experienced diﬃculty in
bidding for contracts, in gaining suﬃciently large areas of landwith secure land rights, and has little interest in working
within the framework of public private partnerships, which
dominate the irrigation sector in Ghana. Currently it has
moved away from investing in the main commercial irrigation
sector within the Accra Plains, and is negotiating to acquire
30,000 ha of land incorporating an old dilapidated state irriga-
tion site, on which it intends to develop both large-scale mech-
anized production and contract farmer arrangements
(Amanor, 2015). In 2014 it was involved in a bid to extend irri-
gation facilities in the Volta Region, including at Aﬁfe/Weta.
Negotiations broke down as a result of community disputes
with various factions claiming rights to the land, or resisting
the ensuing redistribution of land that would occur. ChinaGeo
was also outﬂanked by a consortium of interests, including the
rice producer Global Agri-Development Company (GADCO)
and the largest fertilizer, seed and input distributor, Wienco,
which moved into the area to organize and control the distri-
bution of inputs and the marketing of farmers’ rice (Amanor,
2015). ChinaGeo is also interested in rehabilitating and
expanding a rice research center at Ashiaman, which will serve
to adapt Chinese hybrid varieties for future commercial pro-
duction in Ghana (Amanor, 2015).
A second focus for Chinese investors is agrochemicals, par-
ticularly herbicides, which form the most widely used input in
smallholder agriculture, widely adopted by both farmers and
laborers for land clearance and weeding. The agrochemical
markets are dominated by small agro-dealers situated around
markets in urban and rural areas. Chinese herbicides com-
pletely dominate these markets and have displaced other agro-
chemical producers. There is intense competition between
diﬀerent Chinese agrochemical producers, which has resulted
in Wynca Sunshine, the dominant company, establishing an
assembly plant in Kumasi, which enables it to undercut its riv-
als to control the market (Lerong, Jixia, Tugendhat, &
Xiaoyun, 2015).
Expansion of Chinese agriculture sector interests in Ghana
has been slow. Limits on land access, and the challenges of
securing investment locations have hampered agribusiness
investments. Agriculture is often an oﬀshoot of wider opera-
tions, such as in construction, and so risks can be balanced
against other opportunities. Chinese agribusiness has made
big in-roads in agrochemicals, where they dominate markets
throughout the country. Private agribusiness, especially in
the input supply and service sector, is important, and can be
expected to grow over time, as new business opportunities
are found.
(ii) Brazilian initiatives in the Ghanaian agricultural sector
The main Brazilian bilateral agricultural program initiated
in Ghana has been More Food International (MFI, Cabral
et al., 2016). This aims to provide access to relevant technolo-
gies to enhance smallholder production. However, the MFI
program competes against similar programs within Ghana
with international linkages, both concerned with the provision
of agricultural machinery and inputs to smallholders and the
integration of smallholder farm policies with value chain pro-
motion and social protection. Consequently the MFI program
has been contained within the Agricultural Mechanisation
Services Centre program that seeks to promote the develop-
ment of privatized mechanized services for hire to farmers
(Cabral et al., 2016). MFI has to compete against much larger
Indian concessional bilateral loans for supply of Indian trac-
tors. MOFA has also initiated its own programs that control
the supplies of inputs to smallholders and link to other social
protection and agricultural production programs. This
thwarts the Brazil’s MFI program in Ghana.
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occurred in private sector investments in the rice sector in
the Volta Region, by a Brazilian company, Brazil Agro-
Business Group. This company has introduced techniques of
rice cultivation developed in southern Brazil. It has acquired
5000 ha of land in the Volta Region and has brought techni-
cians from southern Brazil to develop commercial rice produc-
tion (Amanor, 2015). The company claims that its yields in
Ghana are high and far exceed typical yields gained in the rice
production areas of southern Brazil. However, production is
constrained with problems of gaining secure access to land
with rival factions of chiefs and elders within the community
making claims and counter claims to the land in a bid to gain
more rents from the company. The Brazil Agro-Business
Group also experiences diﬃculties in gaining access to machin-
ery, spare parts and seeds from outside of Ghana, as a result of
the regulatory system and entrenched interests that control
imports. The costs of inputs are, as a result, much higher than
in Brazil (Amanor, 2015).
The Brazil Agro-Business Group have also brought techni-
cians from southern Brazil into the Ghanaian rice sector,
and through these connections one Brazilian company,
Agropecua´ria Felloto, has been working with Global Agri-
Development Company (GADCO), an international rice
producing company with linkages to the UK, Nigeria and India,
in developing its commercial rice production (Amanor, 2015).
However, this relationship is no longer ﬂourishing. GADCO’s
main partner in developing technologies for distribution to
contract farmers is now Wienco. Within Ghana, Wienco has
a long history, predating structural adjustment, of supplying
farmers with inputs. Currently, Wienco has linkages with Syn-
genta and Pioneer, channels through which it can import new
seeds for distribution to farmers in Ghana (Amanor, 2015).
Agropecua´ria Fellota has itself relocated to Kenya, where it
is able to gain better access to inputs and cheaper, hybrid
Indian seed seeds. 3
The optimism of Brazilian narratives of the relevance of
Brazilian experience to Africa is not matched by investments
and interventions on the ground in Ghana. As these cases
show, many constraints exist, and Brazilian investments are
likely to proceed slowly and cautiously through the gradual
building up of joint research capability, the establishment of
bilateral credit arrangements creating avenues for Brazilian
technology, and the hiring of Brazilian technical services,
rather than investments in large-scale commercial agriculture.
(b) Mozambique
Portuguese colonialism combined elements of a conces-
sionaire system with European settler farmers and indigenous
peasant production. In the early phase Portuguese settlers
were often involved in trading crops produced by African
cultivators. The development of large Portuguese settler
estates was limited until the early 1960s when an expansion
began to occur. This was the result of a deliberate policy
of settling Portuguese farmers in the colonies. This led to
the development of signiﬁcant export sectors in cotton,
sugar, sisal, and tea, but resulted in the displacement of
many African farmers who were coerced into working as
laborers on European plantations. This resulted in increasing
discontent, which laid the foundations for the anti-colonial
war (Dinerman, 2006; Vail & White, 1980). With the attain-
ment of independence in 1975, Frelimo transformed the colo-
nial estates into state farms. Policies for smallholder farmers
promoted collectivization. During the 1970s and 1980s
Frelimo’s agrarian policies favored large-scale mechanizedstate farms, which received over 90% of the agricultural bud-
get. These policies compounded the marginalization of small-
holder agriculture and failed to raise agricultural production
(Bowen, 1989; Castel-Branco, 1994). The ravages of the civil
war during 1976–92 exacerbated the decline of the agricul-
tural sector.
In 1990 Mozambique abandoned its ‘‘socialism” and opened
itself to liberal market reforms. This resulted in an inﬂux of
international aid and NGOs. Mozambique became heavily
dependent upon food aid, which accounted for 86% of food
consumption in the 1990s and early 2000s, as compared with
9% in 1975 (Brito et al., 2015). In 2007, western donors con-
tributed more than two-thirds of the Ministry of Agriculture
(MINAG) budget (De Renzio & Hanlon, 2007, p. 15). The
main reforms in the agricultural sector under the National
Development Programme (PROAGRI) were concerned with
institutional reforms, promoting market production, food
security, support for smallholders and stimulating agri-
industries. Although PROAGRI was supported by the EU,
World Bank, FAO, UNDP and DANIDA with funds of over
$200 million from 1998 to 2007, the farm incomes of small-
holders and their use of inputs declined (De Renzio &
Hanlon, 2007, p. 5; Cabral, 2009). State investment in agricul-
ture has remained minimal. Only 4% of the annual budget dur-
ing 2000–08 was allocated to agriculture and only 8% of GNP
invested in agriculture in 2010–11 (Mosca, 2014, p. 11). The
smallholder farm sector continues to remain highly
marginalized.
The current Strategic Plan for Agrarian Development
(PEDSA) for 2008–19 stresses support for the family farm sec-
tor by the state. Other agricultural sector policies are con-
cerned with building food security, including the Green
Revolution Strategy adopted in 2007, the National Action
Plan for Food Production and the Strategy and Action Plan
for Food and Nutritional Security. The policies have been
developed in the context of popular discontent with escalating
food prices, which resulted in demonstrations in 2008, 2010
and 2012. Although policy frameworks articulate support
for family farming, there is a noticeable shift toward an
emphasis on foreign investment in large-scale production
and agribusiness. There continues to be a serious deﬁcit in
food production and reliance on imports of rice and wheat.
The government also introduced a new Land Law in 1997,
which provides for clearly recognized customary rights to both
own and sell land. This has facilitated the acquisition of land
leases by foreign corporations through negotiations with cus-
tomary authorities. Tax exemptions also exist to encourage
foreign investment in agricultural infrastructure.
Today, the combination of an agribusiness-friendly policy
environment, a major concern about food security and land
laws that may facilitate investment, has provided a
particular contest for Brazilian and Chinese engagements with
Mozambique.(i) Chinese initiatives in the Mozambican agricultural sector
China has engaged in agricultural initiatives in Mozambique
since independence in 1975, when it supported the develop-
ment of two state farms: Moamba in Maputo Province, and
Matama in Niassa (originally established by the Portuguese
during colonial rule). Both state farms collapsed during the
civil war.
During the 2000s Mozambique received loans from China
Exim Bank to rehabilitate and develop important agricultural
infrastructure in regions considered critical to boosting the
agriculture sector. The two most signiﬁcant developments
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three agro-processing factories (cotton, rice, and maize) in the
provinces of Manica, Zambezia and Tete; and a long-term
credit line from China Exim Bank of US$60 million in 2012
to develop an agricultural complex in Chokwe district, Gaza
province. The Chokwe Agro-Processing Complex aims to
develop cattle breeding and rice farming, rehabilitate irriga-
tion and develop processing facilities. Chinese loans to the
Mozambican agricultural sector are essentially bilateral agree-
ments that support the activities of Chinese companies
(Chichava, 2014c).
Chinese agricultural cooperation in Mozambique is carried
out through two avenues. The ﬁrst involves the establishment
of an Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre
(ATDC), the Centro de Investigac¸a˜o e Transfereˆncia de Tec-
nologia Agra´rias do Umbelu`zi (CITTAU), which was estab-
lished in 2011. This works with national agricultural
institutions, such as the Ministry of Science and Technology
(MCT) and the Institute of Agrarian Research of Mozam-
bique (IIAM) to test the suitability of Chinese seed varieties
to local agroecological conditions, and to develop adaptive
research to enhance local seed varieties (Xu et al., 2016). CIT-
TAU also organizes training courses on technology transfer
for Mozambican agricultural experts and farmers. The ﬁrst
training course on Chinese agricultural technology organized
by CITTAU took place in June 2012 and aimed to educate
local producers on vegetable production, agricultural machin-
ery operation, animal nutrition, rice and maize production,
processing and management. Chinese and Mozambican
experts conducted the course, involving 34 local producers
from the south of the country. CITTAU has also organized
courses on biogas production using organic and animal wastes
(Chichava & Fingerman, 2015).
The second type of initiative involves contract farming
between local Chinese agricultural companies and Mozambi-
can farmers. The main companies involved in these arrange-
ments are Wanbao Africa Development Agriculture Limited
(WAADL), which focuses on rice production, Lianhe Africa
Agriculture Development Company, which is concerned with
rice and cotton, and China–Africa Cotton Mozambique Ltd.
(CACM). WAADL is considered by China Development
Bank (CDB) to be the largest Chinese agribusiness company
in Africa, which it has supported with a loan equivalent to
US$20 million. All three companies provide farmers with
seeds, fertilizers, and agricultural machinery. The costs of
these services are deducted from the ﬁnal yield when the com-
pany buys grains after harvest. According to one Chinese
manager of Lianhe Africa Agriculture Development Com-
pany, the contract farming system used is an adaptation of
the ‘‘Chinese household contract system” (Chichava, 2015).
Other Chinese companies active in Mozambican agriculture
include Sunway International, involved in the production
and processing of groundnuts, China Africa Agriculture Co,
a cotton producer, Agricola CCM, involved in cereal produc-
tion, and Hubei Lianfeng, concerned with the import of agri-
cultural machinery, fertilizers, and agrochemicals, as well as
diverse forms of agricultural production (Chichava, 2014a).
Although the main companies focus on building contract
farming relations, the alienation of land to them for core estate
operations has resulted in local unrest. The WAADL rice
investment in Xai-Xai is one of the leading examples. It has
been accused of depriving local farmers of land, and several
demonstrations have been organized to protest against its
activities (Chichava, 2014b).
Building on long-term engagements, Chinese development
cooperation and agribusiness investment in Mozambique hasexpanded in recent years. Taking over old state farms and
encouraging contract farming of a variety of crops, aimed at
tackling local food deﬁcits is a priority. This has had strong
Chinese state backing, with state-owned enterprises taking
the lead (Gu et al., 2016), and is complemented by the ﬂagship
investment in the ATDC (Xu et al., 2016). Taking over state
farms that have since been occupied can result in local protest,
as has been experienced in Xai-Xai. As a strong partner with
the Mozambican state, China’s eﬀorts in the agricultural sec-
tor, under the broad umbrella of SSC, are likely to continue
to expand.
(ii) Brazilian initiatives in the Mozambican agricultural sector
Brazilian agricultural initiatives in Mozambique, as in
Ghana, are structured around social protection, technology
transfer and export of Brazilian agribusiness products. They
involve both bilateral transfers associated with export of
Brazilian machinery and trilateral programs with western
donors associated with technology transfer, which is often
articulated within a framework of SSC. In March 2015, Brazil
and Mozambique signed a Cooperation and Investment Facil-
itation Agreement (ACFI) with the aim of ‘‘strengthening the
internationalization of Brazilian companies by giving investors
greater security”. 4 This indicates the commitment of the
Brazilian government to support Brazilian private sector
investment in Mozambique.
As in Ghana, the main bilateral program is the MFI pro-
gram, which provides credits for the export of Brazilian trac-
tors and other agricultural machinery to Mozambique,
within a framework of support for family farming (Cabral
et al., 2016). However, in addition to this the Government
of Brazil has initiated the Purchase from Africa for Africa
(PAA) program in 2012, which aims to contribute to food
security by purchasing food crops from local farmers to supply
local school feeding programs. It is carried out in partnership
with the FAO, World Food Programme and DFID.
The main technology transfer program is ProSAVANA,
which involves Brazil’s largest aid disbursement in Africa of
US$21 million, implemented in partnership with Japan. It
seeks to replicate the technologies used in developing the Cer-
rado region of Brazil in Mozambique, in relation to both
smallholder and commercial agriculture (Gonsalves and
Shankland, 2016). The project has three components: improv-
ing and strengthening agricultural research and extension
capacities; implementing pilot projects for small and commer-
cial growers; and developing broader infrastructure to support
the development of markets and commercial agriculture
within the Nacala corridor. The long-term objective is to lay
the foundation for future Brazilian and Japanese investments
by creating an agricultural infrastructure servicing diﬀerent
categories of farmers, which will facilitate vertical linkages
between input suppliers, farm producers, and food processors.
Business promotion activities have also been carried out to
encourage Brazilian and Japanese agribusiness to invest in
Mozambique; to mobilize Japanese and Brazilian capital to
support agribusiness developments, and to support farmer
associations organized by Brazilian farmers to integrate small-
holders into agribusiness value chains (Chichava et al., 2013).
Loans are also to be provided to assist the development of
commercial enterprises that integrate smallholders into con-
tract farming. However, ProSAVANA has sparked huge con-
troversy, with local civil society organizations claiming that
the project will deprive local farmers of their land and beneﬁt
only Brazilian and Japanese multinationals and the Mozambi-
can elite, resulting in a ‘‘No ProSAVANA” campaign
(Gonsalves and Shankland, 2016). ProSAVANA has also been
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resulted in a decline of investment in developing projects
(Mellor, 2015).
Private Brazilian agricultural investments are also taking
place in Mozambique. These include Mozaperon Agrope-
cua´ria and Araperon Agropecua´ria, which have acquired land
for cereal and livestock production in Nampula and Niassa
province respectively, and Agromoz, a subsidiary of Grupo
Pinesso from Brazil, which in September 2012 announced its
intentions to produce soybean in Gurue, Zambe´zia province.
Given long-term links, Mozambique has a much more
developed engagement with Brazil than Ghana. The favorable
investment environment, combined with the availability of
land has provided more opportunities for agribusiness, while
the close government-to-government relations have allowed
MFI to take oﬀ, at least at a small scale. Compared to Chinese
engagements, Brazilian development cooperation and
agribusiness ventures are often in partnership with others,
sometimes mediated by international organizations such as
the FAO, which currently has a Brazilian director general.
However, the reactions to the large-scale plans of ProSA-
VANA, combined with the economic crisis in Brazil, have
resulted in some back-tracking, with some of the wider ambi-
tions put on hold, at least for now.6. CONCLUSION
As the examples from Ghana and Mozambique show, there
are ranges of engagements in the agricultural sector by both
Brazil and China. However these are often quite tentative,
with grand plans often not materializing. State support to
agribusiness investment is very evident in all cases, with the
backing of credit lines, technology demonstration and train-
ing, research and exchange visits. While presented under the
rhetoric of SSC, the modalities of contemporary Chinese
and Brazilian interventions within African agriculture are
highly inﬂuenced by agribusiness accumulation and the incen-
tives for investment for the long term. Opportunities in Africa
are in turn inﬂuenced by the structural reforms introduced by
Brazil and China in their domestic economies to create a
highly competitive agribusiness sector. However, the capaci-
ties of Chinese and Brazilian agribusiness to intervene in Afri-
can agriculture is ultimately inﬂuenced by the nature of
competition and control of agricultural markets, access to
land and the political context, including civil society reactions
to external interventions.
In Ghana, the state has been actively involved in integrat-
ing smallholders into input and processing markets since the1970s. As a consequence, entrenched interests and estab-
lished alliances dominate input markets, which frequently
constrains and frustrates new entrants. Thus, the Brazilian
attempt to extend the MFI program in Ghana has been frus-
trated. Similarly, Chinese initiatives to expand irrigated rice
farming have been outﬂanked by other seed and input pro-
grams. In contrast, in Mozambique, the state favors large-
scale agriculture and foreign investment in estate agriculture,
and has little vested interest in contract farming integrated
with state agricultural services. This results in a less devel-
oped agricultural infrastructure of service provisioning and
more scope for foreign investors and donors to be involved
in shaping and supporting agricultural services, including
through trilateral cooperation initiatives, such as the ProSA-
VANA ﬂagship initiative. Through the existence of the
ATDC, Chinese agricultural technologies and seeds have
also made greater inroads into Mozambican markets. There
is also more scope for Brazilian and Chinese companies to
acquire land in Mozambique than in Ghana. However this
results in local and civil society unrest and opposition. In
Ghana, the existence of well-developed markets creates
opportunities for the private sector, as in the intense compe-
tition among Chinese agrochemical suppliers leading to the
establishment of a local manufacturing plant. But private
sector companies can also relocate to other countries, where
more favorable conditions are thought to operate, as in the
case of Agropecua´ria Fellota.
Although taking on diﬀerent characteristics in the national
contexts of Ghana and Mozambique, the interventions of
China and Brazil in the agricultural sector are similar to
those promoted by other international agencies, donors
and agribusinesses, forming the basis for a gradual extension
of agribusiness and commercial inputs into African rural
areas. Although the framework of SSC promises to develop
a framework of mutual learning and joint beneﬁts, the tech-
nology transfers and investments in practice operate within
the dominant frameworks of global agribusiness and capital
accumulation. Interventions rarely create platforms for a
more reﬂexive debate on sustainable agriculture or equitable
development, nor do they promote forms of rural mobiliza-
tion for more participatory development. They instead
reﬂect the dominant trends in contemporary agricultural
development that promote market penetration, capital accu-
mulation and the integration of smallholders into existing
forms of market accumulation. Beyond the framing of diplo-
matic relations within SSC, the underlying processes of Chi-
nese and Brazilian engagements in Africa have many
similarities with the accumulation imperatives of agribusi-
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